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NOTES
CHOOSING A STANDARD FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE IN TITLE VII LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
This Note examines the concept of constructive discharge in
the context of litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 This issue commonly arises in employment discrimination
proceedings. 2 Typically, the former employee claims that his resig-
nation was involuntary because it resulted from discriminatory3 con-
ditions imposed by the defendant employer.4 All but one5 of the
I Civil Rights Act of 1965, tit. vii, §§ 702-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1982) [hereinafter referred to as title VII].
2 The procedural processes and requirements applying to initiation of private suits
under title VII are set forth in § 706 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. For a more de-
tailed exposition, see generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 933-1337 (2d ed. 1983).
3 Section 703 of title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
4 An allegation of constructive discharge can arise in two different contexts. First,
an employee may allege that the constructive discharge was the discriminatory act. If
she is unable to prove this claim, then her employer is not liable. Alternatively, an em-
ployer may be liable for a discriminatory act, e.g., passing a woman over for a promotion
on account of her sex. But if the employee cannot also show that her subsequent resig-
nation amounted to a constructive discharge, then her employer's liability for back pay
terminates on the date of her resignation. This discussion should not suggest that there
are two types of constructive discharge; it merely illustrates that different consequences
result depending upon the nature of the constructive discharge allegation.
5 The Seventh Circuit has not adopted either standard in the context of a title VII
action. In a suit for damages under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), the Seventh Circuit utilized the reasonable employee standard in assessing plain-
tiffs claim that his constructive discharge from a position as a policeman deprived him
of property without due process of law, thereby violating the fourteenth amendment.
See Parrett v. City of Connersville, Ind., 737 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1984) (court favora-
bly cited two leading title VII cases applying reasonable employee standard), cert. dis-
missed, 105 S. Ct. 828 (1985). Within this same Seventh Circuit, however, district courts
have used both the reasonable constructive discharge claims brought under title VII. See
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circuit courts of appeals have adopted one of two standards for
resolving claims of constructive discharge in the context of title VII
litigation. The First,6 Second, 7 Third,8 Fifth, 9 Sixth,' 0 Ninth,"1 Elev-
enth,12 and District of Columbia13 Circuit Courts of Appeals hold
that a plaintiff has established a constructive discharge when he has
shown that the conditions of employment were sufficiently intolera-
ble that a reasonable employee would have resigned.' 4 The
Fourth,' 5 Eighth, 16 and Tenth Circuit' 7 Courts of Appeals hold that
in addition to demonstrating intolerable conditions, a plaintiff must
show that her employer had the specific intent of coercing her
resignation.18
This Note first traces the development of the doctrine of con-
Michaelis v. Polk Bros., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 109, 116-17 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (evidence insuffi-
cient to show defendant "imposed ... conditions ... for the purpose of forcing [em-
ployee] to resign"); Scott v. Oc6 Indus., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 141, 148 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(defendant made plaintiffs "working conditions so difficult and unpleasant that a rea-
sonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign"). The Michaelis
court did not discuss the Scott decision.
6 Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (applying reason-
able employee standard to find employee's transfer insufficient to constitute construc-
tive discharge).
7 Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying reasonable
employee standard to find change in job responsibilities with no loss of pay or change of
title insufficient to constitute constructive discharge).
8 Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The court
need merely find that the employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in
employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.").
9 Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra notes
81-102 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of Bourque.
10 Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying reasonable
employee standard to find "environment of sexual bias" sufficient to constitute con-
structive discharge).
11 Heagney v. University of Wash., 652 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying reason-
able employee standard to find unequal pay alone insufficient to constitute constructive
discharge).
12 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (adopting reasonable
employee standard and holding hostile and offensive working environment sufficient to
constitute constructive discharge).
13 Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See infra note 109 for a discus-
sion of Clark.
14 Courts frequently refer to this as the "objective standard." See, e.g., Goss, 747
F.2d at 887. This Note will refer to the objective standard as the "reasonable employee"
standard.
15 EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983) (evidence demon-
strating employer urged plaintiff not to resign proved employer did not constructively
discharge plaintiff), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467
U.S. 867 (1984).
16 Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981) (equally harsh treat-
ment of all employees rebuts inference that employer intended to force plaintiff to
resign).
17 Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975). For an ex-
tended discussion of Muller, see infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
18 Because this standard primarily examines an employer's intent, it is sometimes
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structive discharge and sets forth the two standards that courts have
used to decide this issue, identifying both their common point of
origin and their subsequent divergence. This Note then critically
examines which standard is more appropriate for use in title VII ac-
tions in light of the policies underlying title VII and the employer
and employee interests at stake in constructive discharge cases.
This Note concludes that the reasonable employee standard is more
appropriate. Adoption of a uniform standard would reduce the po-
tential for identical sets of facts producing different results. Finally,
such a standard would help clarify the duties owed by both em-
ployer and employee in their employment relationship.
I
THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
A. Constructive Discharge Under the NLRA ,
The immediate precursor of the doctrine of constructive dis-
charge under title VII can be found in cases arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 19 The NLRA expressly
prohibits employers from engaging in certain unfair labor practices,
such as interfering with employees' rights to form labor organiza-
tions and bargain collectively. 20 The NLRA includes discrimination
as an unfair labor practice but does not prohibit all discrimination
arising out of an employment relationship.2 1 Instead, the Act pros-
cribes employer discrimination "in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment. . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." 22 Concomitantly, inquiry into the employer intent
that led to the alleged discriminatory act is limited: "[I]n most
referred to as the "subjective standard." This Note will refer to this standard as the
"employer intent" standard.
19 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
20 Id. § 158(a)(1).
21 Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,43 (1954) (§ 8(a)(3) does not outlaw
all discrimination, only discrimination that encourages or discourages membership in
labor organization).
Title VII and the NLRA differ in terms of the underlying policies and the footing of
the parties, as the NLRA presupposes that the employee is a union member in most
instances, whereas title VII does not. These differences weaken the argument that the
National Labor Relations Board standard for assessing whether there has been a con-
structive discharge should be adopted wholesale into title VII. See infra note 58.
22 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). For accounts of how the NLRA has interpreted the statu-
tory language involving "discrimination," see Shieber, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act; A Rationale: Part L Discrimination, 29 LA. L. REv. 46 (1968) (discriminatory
act must impinge on NLRA § 7 employee rights (29 U.S.C. § 157), although treatment
need not differentiate among workers); Ward, "Discrimination" Under the National Labor
Relations Board, 48 YALE LJ. 1152 (1939) (criticizing Board for reading NLRA protection
of union activities too broadly, and maintaining that § 8(a)(3) protects employees only
against employer's actions that discourage or encourage union membership).
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cases, the employer's reason for discriminating will determine
whether he has committed an unfair labor practice. If the discrimi-
nation is motivated by an anti-union purpose and has the foresee-
able effect of either encouraging or discouraging union
membership, it violates section 8(a)(3). '"23 Absent this showing, the
employer may discharge an employee for any reason.24
Recognizing that an employer may effect a discharge without
formally firing the employee, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has long utilized the doctrine of constructive discharge. If
employers were permitted to impose unpleasant working conditions
to force union employees out, they could accomplish indirectly what
the NLRA forbids them to do directly.
In Crystal Princeton Refining Co. 25 the Board articulated the con-
structive discharge standard as follows:
There are two elements which must be proven to establish a "con-
structive discharge." First, the burdens imposed upon the em-
ployee must cause, and be intended to cause, a change in his
working conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to
resign. Second, it must be shown that those burdens were im-
posed because of the employee's union activities.26
The second element requires a showing that the employer imposed
the burdens because of the employee's union activities. This re-
quirement recognizes that the NLRA only proscribes discrimination
motivated by an anti-union animus. 27
The first element of the NLRB's standard represents the basic
concept underlying the constructive discharge doctrine, that the em-
ployee must demonstrate that an imposition of intolerable condi-
tions prompted his resignation. This first element, however,
encompasses two distinct ideas. First, the employer must impose the
conditions with the requisite intent. Second, the conditions must be
of a certain character. The standard does not indicate, however,
from whose perspective one should gauge whether the conditions
were intolerable. Thus, a court applying the first element of the
NLRB standard to a claim of constructive discharge must answer
two questions:
(1) whether, in order to have a constructive discharge, the em-
23 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 187 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
24 See Midwest Regional Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 564
F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Absent a showing of anti-union motivation, an em-
ployer may discharge an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all
without running afoul of the labor laws."). Other statutory provisions or contract rights,
however, may circumscribe an employer's freedom to discharge an employee.
25 222 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1976).
26 Id. at 1069.
27 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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ployer's acts (or omissions) must have been taken with the express
intention of forcing a resignation, and (2) what criterion should be
used to determine whether the conditions actually prompting the
resignation were. . . so intolerable as to justify deeming the res-
ignation an involuntary one.28
Courts adopting the doctrine of constructive discharge for applica-
tion in title VII cases have also faced these questiors, as indicated by
the following two cases.
B. Absorption into Title VII
Two of the earliest court of appeals cases2 9 to apply the doc-
trine of constructive discharge in title VII litigation were Muller v.
United States Steel Corp. 30 and Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan As-
sociation.3 1 Although the courts in these two cases appeared to for-
mulate very similar standards for applying the doctrine, their use of
these standards differed. In effect, the Muller and Young courts be-
gan to reach different answers concerning whether the employee
must show that the employer intended to force the employee to re-
sign. These different analyses foreshadowed the eventual split of
authority on the appropriate standard for assessing a claim of con-
structive discharge.
1. Muller v. United States Steel Corp.
In Muller, the Spanish-American plaintiff alleged that he was a
victim of national origin discrimination. 32 He claimed that the de-
fendant corporation's selection process for supervisory positions in
its pipe mill had a disparate impact 33 on him and other Spanish-
28 Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 651,477 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App., cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984).
State court treatment of constructive discharge is beyond the scope of this Note.
29 The EEOC adopted the doctrine of constructive discharge before any courts of
appeals had passed on the question. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 72-2062, EEOC Dec.
(CCH) 6366, at 4664, 4666 (June 22, 1972) ("Thus [the employee's] resignation was
directly related to [the employer's] unlawful employment practices, and we conclude
that ... the resignation was a foreseeable consequence of these unlawful practices and
constitutes a constructive discharge .... ").
30 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
31 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
32 509 F.2d at 926.
33 The Supreme Court explained the concept of disparate impact as follows:
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is
not required under a disparate-impact theory.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
1986]
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American employees.34 During his employment as a production
worker from 1968 to 1969, Muller twice filed charges with the state
agency handling discrimination disputes,3 5 contending that the cor-
poration's failure to promote him to a position as a spell foreman
was discriminatory. The state agency took no action on Muller's
charges. Later in 1969 the mill closed, and Muller was reassigned as
a laborer. Muller resigned his position in August 1969 and brought
suit under title VII.3 6
The district court determined "that the promotional system vi-
olated Title VII in that it lent itself to discrimination and was not
shown to have been the product of business necessity." 37 The court
also found that Muller had been constructively discharged because
his "resignation was not a matter of free choice; .. .it resulted
from discrimination." 38 In reaching its first conclusion, that the
promotion system violated title VII, the court relied on statistics ad-
duced by Muller. These statistics showed that although Spanish-
Americans were not underrepresented in the defendant's work
force, no Spanish-American had become a spell foreman since
1963. 39 The district court granted injunctive relief and awarded
Muller back pay and attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's findings that the corporation's promotion process had a dis-
parate impact and that the corporation had not shown any business
necessity sufficient to justify its practice. 40 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, reversed the district court's finding that the corporation had
constructively discharged Muller.4'
In so doing, however, the court ratified the use of constructive
discharge in title VII actions. 42 The court's analysis indicated that
34 509 F.2d at 927.
35 Id. at 925.
36 Id.
37 Id. The district court decision was unreported.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 926-28 (discussion of corporation's promotion practice that had dispa-
rate impact on Spanish-Americans); id. at 928-29 (analysis of whether business necessity
justified use of employment practice having discriminatory impact).
41 Id. at 929. The exact grounds for reversal are unclear. The court stated that
"there [was] a dearth of evidence to show a deliberate effort to make things difficult for
the employee so as to bring about his separation." Id. The appeals court's statement
suggests that the district court had used an erroneous standard for a showing of con-
structive discharge; alternatively, the statement may mean that the district court utilized
the proper standard but the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of construc-
tive discharge.
42 The ratification, however, hardly constituted a ringing endorsement. After not-
ing the development of constructive discharge as a labor law doctrine, the most positive
statement the court could make regarding its application in the instant case was, "We
are not saying that this constructive discharge doctrine which developed in labor cases is
[Vol. 71:587
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to prevail on a constructive discharge claim a plaintiff must show
that the employer acted with the specific intent of forcing the em-
ployee to resign. The court found that the company's actions "were
not designed to coerce [Muller's] resignation. ' 43 The court cited
several NLRB constructive discharge cases to justify its determina-
tion that an employee must demonstrate the employer's specific in-
tent to compel an involuntary resignation.44 The Tenth Circuit
noted that in each NLRB case "there was extrinsic evidence to es-
tablish that an effort had been made to render the job. . . unattrac-
tive and unpleasant. '45 Although the Muller court provided useful
guidance concerning the quantum of evidence necessary to show in-
tent to force a resignation, it barely addressed the question of what
measure should apply in assessing whether the conditions of em-
ployment were intolerable.
2. Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Association
Young began working as a teller at a branch office of the de-
fendant employer's bank in February 1971.46 Although she was
aware when she accepted the position that Southwestern required
its employees to attend monthly staff meetings, Young did not dis-
cover that the meetings began with a brief religious exercise, con-
ducted by a Baptist minister, until she attended her first meeting.47
Young, an atheist, attended the February and March meetings with-
out complaint, but then decided not to attend any other meetings.
inapplicable to civil rights cases." Id. Moreover, the appeals court's statement might be
dictum because the relevant issue on appeal was "the holding that there was a construc-
tive discharge." Id. at 926. Thus, the court may have decided that regardless of whether
the invocation of the constructive discharge doctrine is proper in title VII cases, the facts
of the case did not warrant a finding of constructive discharge. In any event, later Tenth
Circuit decisions cite Muller for its articulation of the constructive discharge doctrine.
See Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982); Coe v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 454 (10th Cir. 1981).
43 509 F.2d at 929. The court's citation to Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. State,
30 Colo. App. 10, 488 P.2d 83 (1971), is significant because the Colorado court's discus-
sion of constructive discharge appeared to adopt a standard that did not consider the
employer's specific intent. "The fact of [constructive] discharge does not depend upon
the use of formal works of firing. The test is whether sufficient words or actions by the
employer 'would logically lead a prudent person to believe his tenure had been termi-
nated.'" Id. at 16, 488 P.2d at 86 (quoting NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.2d
841 (8th Cir. 1964)). Thus, the Muller court had before it an alternative "prudent per-
son" standard when it adopted the "employer intent" standard for constructive
discharge.
44 509 F.2d at 929. Specifically, the court cited NLRB v. Century Broadcasting
Corp., 419 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn
Div., 339 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1964); and Steel Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 173 (7th
Cir. 1963).
45 509 F.2d at 929.
46 Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 141 (5th Cir. 1975).
47 Id. at 142.
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In September 1971, when the manager of Young's branch office
learned of her absences and asked her for an explanation, Young
revealed her objection to the religious component of the meetings.
The manager maintained that attendance was mandatory.48
Although the manager had no authority to discharge Young,49 she
resigned later that day, explaining to her manager that she believed
that he had fired her.50
Young brought suit against her employer in federal district
court, alleging religious discrimination. 51 The district court found
that Young had failed to show that her refusal to attend the monthly
staff meetings had resulted in any discriminatory act by her em-
ployer and concluded that she had resigned voluntarily. 52 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed this finding, holding
"that the district court required too high a standard for a construc-
tive discharge." 53 The correct standard, the Fifth Circuit an-
nounced, was "that if the employer deliberately makes an
employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is
forced into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has en-
compassed a constructive discharge and is as liable for any illegal
conduct involved therein as if it had formally discharged the ag-
grieved employee." 54
The Young court's formulation of the standard for constructive
discharge differed little from the standard enunciated by the Muller
court.55 Despite the apparent similarity, however, each court's anal-
ysis concentrated on only one of the two elements involved in the
doctrine of constructive discharge. The Muller court focused pri-
marily on whether the employer intended to force the employee to
resign.56 In determining that Young's employer had constructively
48 Id.
49 Id. at 144 n.7.
50 Id. at 142.
51 Id. at 143.
52 Id. The district court decision was unreported. Unlike Muller, Young was claim-
ing that her employer had treated her disparately because of her lack of religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court has explained the concept of disparate treatment as follows:
"Disparate treatment". . . is the most easily understood type of discrimi-
nation. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof
of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (cita-
tion omitted).
53 509 F.2d at 143-44.
54 Id. at 144.
55 Id. The Young court, like the court in Muller, relied exclusively on NLRB cases in
formulating its constructive discharge standard. See id. and Muller, 509 F.2d at 929. See
supra text accompanying notes 42-45 for the Muller court's standard.
56 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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discharged her, the Young court conceded "that the course of events
leading to Mrs. Young's departure was rather too swift and sponta-
neous to admit any inference of an 'atmosphere of religious intimi-
dation.' "-57 Instead, the court concentrated on Young's reasonable
belief that she would eventually be discharged because of her re-
fusal to attend the meetings and not on whether the employer pos-
sessed a specific intent to coerce her resignation. The Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that Young's belief arose from her supervisor's state-
ment that meetings were mandatory for all employees, but it did not
discuss whether the statement indicated anything about the em-
ployer's state of mind.58
The differences between the Muller and Young analyses can be
demonstrated by considering how each court would have decided
the other circuit's case. The Muller court almost certainly would
have decided in favor of Young's employer. The evidence did not
57 509 F.2d at 143. The Young court did not identify the source of its quotation.
58 See Note, Civil Rights-Religious Discrimination in Employment-Tite VII Standards of
"Reasonable Accommodation" and "Undue Hardship" Are Constitutional, But Recent Cases llus-
trateJudicial Overzealousness in Enforcement, 54 TEx. L. REV. 616 (1976), for a criticism of
the Young court's finding constructive discharge without considering "whether the situa-
tion was deliberately created" by the employer. Id. at 638. The Note agrees with
Young's application of the constructive discharge doctrine to title VII because "Title VII,
like the National Labor Relations Act, is designed to prevent discrimination in employ-
ment." Id. at 637-38 (footnote omitted). The Note concludes that "[a] watering down
of the constructive discharge standard in the context of Title VII litigation serves only to
infringe upon employer rights with no compensating benefit to employee[s]." Id. at
640.
This criticism of Young's "watering down" of the constructive discharge standard by
omitting the specific employer intent required in labor cases begs the question of
whether the reasons for developing a two-pronged test for enforcing NLRA § 8(a)(3)'s
proscriptions apply in the title VII context. Several factors suggest that the reasons for
applying an employer intent standard in NLRB discrimination cases are less persuasive
when discrimination is alleged under title VII.
First, in deciding whether an employer has constructively discharged an employee
in violation of § 8(a)(3), the NLRB must determine whether the employer has commit-
ted an unfair labor practice and should therefore be held liable. In contrast, the issue in
many title VII constructive discharge cases is the extent, rather than the existence, of the
employer's liability; i.e., whether liability ends on the date the employee left work or
whether it continues beyond that date because a constructive discharge is found. Thus,
employers often do not stand on the same footing in NLRB and title VII constructive
discharge cases.
Second, by its very nature the discrimination proscribed by the NLRA is more diffi-
cult to detect than the discrimination outlawed by title VII. Title VII primarily bans
discrimination based on such immutable characteristics as race, color, sex, and national
origin; the one exception is the proscription against religious discrimination. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1982). Section 8(a)(3) is arguably narrower than title VII, in that it is con-
cered only with discrimination motivated by anti-union animus. Moreover, union
membership is not an immutable characteristic. Thus, if one of the concerns favoring
the employer intent standard is that employers should not be held liable for innocent
actions, such a concern is not as compelling in title VII as it is in NLRB cases. In short,
title VII constructive discharge cases are more likely to include indicia of invidious moti-
vation than are NLRB constructive discharge cases.
1986] 595
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suggest that the bank intended to force out nonbelievers by includ-
ing in its business meetings a short religious program. The branch
manager's reiteration of the policy probably would not have estab-
lished the requisite specific intent.
A determination of how the Young court would have decided
Muller's claim is less certain because the Muller opinion does not
disclose how many times the company passed Muller over for a pro-
motion.59 It is unclear whether the Young court would have found
Muller's beliefs about the cause of his failure to be promoted and
prospects for future promotions to be reasonable. If Muller's com-
pany had repeatedly passed him over, the Young court might have
decided that a reasonable belief prompted his action. On the other
hand, if the company had only passed Muller over once, then the
Young court might have agreed with the Muller court's result. Thus,
the choice of approach, whether that of Muller or Young, might well
determine the outcome of a constructive discharge claim.60
The next two sections of this Note examine the different stan-
dards implied by the Young and Muller approaches. The selection of
a constructive discharge standard is important because if the stan-
dard is too stringent, some meritorious employee claims may be de-
nied; if the standard is excessively permissive, employers will be
exposed to liability that they would not otherwise face. Finally, the
choice has implications for applicability of title VII prohibitions and
sanctions in certain situations.
II
THE EMPLOYER INTENT STANDARD FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE CLAIMS
The employer intent standard enunciated in Muller is a two-
pronged test. An employee must show both intolerable work condi-
tions and the employer's specific intent to coerce the employee's
resignation.61 Unlike the analysis in Young, in which the tension be-
tween the doctrine enunciated and the approach the court actually
59 The court stated that Muller was never chosen as a spell foreman in his 14 years
of employment. 509 F.2d at 925. The court did not indicate, however, when Muller
became qualified to perform in that capacity. Also, the court did not indicate whether
Muller was aware that no Spanish-American had been appointed as spell foreman since
1965. Thus, it is unclear whether Muller thought he was facing a long-standing com-
pany practice as opposed to an isolated discriminatory act. Id. Finally, although the
court cited statistics for 1968 and 1969 showing that all 20-25 employees selected as
spell foremen were of "anglo origin," roughly 707 had more seniority than Muller; 20
other workers with more seniority than Muller also were not selected to be spell fore-
men. Id.
60 For an argument that the choice of standard will not affect the outcome in many
cases, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
61 See infra note 126 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Fifth Circuit
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took prompted development of a standard focusing on the nature of
the conditions imposed, the Muller employer intent standard was a
fully developed analysis. 62 The other circuits that have adopted it
have made few changes. 63 One post-Muller Tenth Circuit case, Coe
v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 64 indicates what a plaintiff must show to
establish the employer's intent. The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the
district court's finding that the employer had not constructively dis-
charged the plaintiff,65 found "a dearth of evidence. . . tending to
show that [the employer] deliberately engaged in a course of con-
duct designed to force plaintiff's working conditions to be so intol-
erable that he would be forced to quit."' 66
The Tenth Circuit's statement suggests that while a plaintiff
must show both employer intent to terminate the employee and in-
tolerable work conditions, the employee does not have to present
evidence probative of the employer's intent and other evidence
showing the intolerable conditions. The evidence that a plaintiff
presents, however, must establish both the requisite employer in-
tent and intolerable conditions. Courts rejecting the employer in-
tent analysis in favor of a reasonable employee standard describe
the Muller criteria as the more "stringent" of the two. 67 The strin-
gency of the Muller employer intent standard is occasioned by its
requirement that an employee prove an additional element with her
evidence; it does not require the employee to present more
evidence.
The Muller court was silent on why it opted for a more stringent
standard. This stricter employer intent standard is more favorable
to employers. Presumably, the Tenth Circuit was concerned that a
permissive standard would encourage employee resignations and
decisions have transformed the reasonable employee standard into a two-pronged test
superficially resembling the Muller standard.
62 The Muller court did not address directly whether the employer-imposed condi-
tions should be evaluated using the employee's subjective judgment or the objective
judgment of a reasonable employee. Because the Muller court required the plaintiff to
meet a more stringent standard, the objective analysis should govern. A subsequent
Tenth Circuit case, Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982),
confirms that even under a Muller employer intent standard, courts must measure the
intolerability of working conditions from the viewpoint of the reasonable employee.
63 See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983) (" '['T]he
employer's actions must be intended by the employer as an effort to force the employee
to quit.'") (quoting Irving, 689 F.2d at 172), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984);Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d
1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981) ("To constitute a constructive discharge, the employer's ac-
tions must have been taken with the intention of forcing the employee to quit.").
64 646 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1981).
65 Id. at 455. The district court's decision was unreported.
66 Id. at 454.
67 See, e.g., Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bourque v. Powell
Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980).
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possibly frivolous lawsuits. The Fifth Circuit's development of the
reasonable employee standard also reflects these concerns.
III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REASONABLE EMPLOYEE
STANDARD FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
The Young court's analysis only suggested what a fully devel-
oped standard might be. This Note now examines the Fifth Circuit's
evolving constructive discharge analysis, tracing this doctrine from
its adoption in Young to its culmination as an explicit standard in
Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co. 68 This section also re-
views how other Fifth Circuit cases, decided after Bourque, have re-
fined the Bourque reasonable employee standard, making more
concrete what might otherwise be an amorphous standard.
Although the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the proper resolution
of constructive discharge claims depends largely on the facts of each
case, 69 the court's treatment of certain issues arising under the rea-
sonable employee standard indicates what a plaintiff should show to
prevail on his claim. The post-Bourque cases indicate that the Fifth
Circuit's standard, while not as stringent as the employer intent
standard, is nonetheless a rigorous one.
A. The Transition from Young to Bourque: Calcote
The most important step in transforming the Young constructive
discharge doctrine into the Bourque reasonable employee standard
was resolving the issue of employer intent. The Young analysis left
uncertain what the court meant by its use of "deliberately" in its
enunciation of the doctrine of constructive discharge.
The Fifth Circuit addressed this question in Calcote v. Texas Edu-
cational Foundation, Inc. 70 Calcote reviewed a lower court finding 7'
that an employer had discriminated against a white employee whose
initial salary and subsequent pay increases were lower than those of
blacks in comparable positions and who had been harassed by his
black supervisor.72 The lower court concluded that these conditions
amounted to a constructive discharge. 73 Although agreeing with the
district court that Calcote had been constructively discharged, the
68 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
69 See, e.g., Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 1983) (court evaluated
entire "employment milieu" in deciding constructive discharge claim).
70 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978).
71 458 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
72 578 F.2d at 96-97.
73 458 F. Supp. at 237.
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court of appeals focused on the deliberate nature of the employer's
actions.
In concluding that the actions that prompted Calcote's resigna-
tion were deliberate, the court was careful to show that one of the
employer's departments or employees was directly responsible for
those actions. The court noted that someone in the personnel office
established both Calcote's starting salary and his job classification,
and later gave Galcote a lower salary increase than was recom-
mended.74 Finally, the court found that Calcote's supervisor had
harassed Calcote within the course of his duties as supervisor. The
court held that the supervisor's acts were "deliberate" acts of the
employer.75 The court concluded, ."We think the Conclusions of
Law of the district court should be expanded to reflect. . . that the
actions which caused Calcote's working conditions to be intolerable
were deliberate."'76
The Calcote court's analysis of the deliberateness of the em-
ployer's actions differed from that of the Muller court. In Calcote the
court sought only to show that the defendant employer was respon-
sible for the actions of its personnel and that these acts were not
accidental. The court did not discuss the intentions of the person-
nel beyond noting the district court's conclusion that racial preju-
dice prompted the harassment of Calcote by his supervisor. 77
Significantly, the court did not discuss whether the supervisor's har-
assment was intended to force Calcote's resignation. Calcote thus re-
quires that the plaintiff show that the employer intended its acts, but
the decision does not require a showing that the acts were specifi-
cally intended to cause the employee's resignation.
The Calcote court's focus on the nature of the employer's behav-
ior was prompted by the district court's failure to address the Young
deliberateness requirement: "The district judge . . . did not use
the word 'deliberately' or 'intentionally' in describing the construc-
tive discharge doctrine, although the authorities he referred to con-
tain that requirement. ' 7  One of the authorities the district court
cited was Muller.79 Although the Calcote court's analysis effectively
repudiates Muller, the court did not explicitly reject it. Thus, the
Calcote decision represents a transition to the express reasonable
employee standard enunciated in Bourque.80
74 578 F.2d at 98.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 97.
78 Id.
79 458 F. Supp. at 237.
80 Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Go., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
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B. Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co.
Bourque began work for the defendant employer in 1967 as a
clerk and secretary in the purchasing department and later assumed
supervisory responsibilities over other secretaries.8 1 In February
1975, a position as a buyer in the department became available, and
Bourque applied for it. The company's vice-president for personnel
initially expressed reluctance to hire her but eventually accepted
Bourque's application. 82 He informed Bourque, however, that she
would not receive the $950 monthly salary paid the previous buyer.
Instead, she was to continue at her current salary, $675 per month,
with her position subject to a ninety day trial period. Bourque ac-
cepted the offer, insisting upon the trial period and a raise to $850
per month should she successfully complete the period.83
Bourque's supervisors deemed her trial period performance a
success and granted her a salary increase. The increase, however,
brought her monthly salary to only $719, $131 less than she had
requested 84 and $213 less than the previous buyer had earned. She
resigned shortly thereafter. 85
In Bourque's subsequent title VII action, the district court
found that she had suffered wage discrimination because of her
sex.86 The district court, however, relied on Muller in holding that
Bourque had resigned voluntarily because "there [was] no evidence
that anyone. . . deliberately attempted to render her working con-
ditions so intolerable that she would be forced to quit. ' ' 87 The dis-
trict court distinguished Young as involving a clear threat of
discharge and the denial of the fundamental right to freedom of reli-
gion.8 8 Both Bourque and her employer appealed from the district
court's decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's determination that Bourque had resigned voluntarily, 89 but
81 Id. at 63.
82 Id. In 1973 and 1974, Bourque had begun to perform some of the functions of
the buyer and "expediters" in her department; she occasionally substituted for buyers
who were on vacation.
83 Id. at 63-64.
84 Id. Bourque was insisting on a raise, relative to both her then current salary as a
secretary and the amount she was to be paid at her new position, but one that would pay
her $100 less than the previous male incumbent. Id.
85 Id. The Fifth Circuit's Bourque opinion does not indicate whether Bourque com-
plained to anyone within the company about its failure to raise her salary to $850.
86 445 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
87 Id. at 129.
88 Id.
89 617 F.2d at 64. The Fifth Circuit stressed that Bourque had voluntarily accepted
the position at a salary lower than the previous occupant received. Id. at 65. Her accept-
ance of a discriminatory condition in her employment is similar to another employee's
action in a title VII case decided one month before Bourque. In Miller v. Texas State Bd.
[Vol. 71:587600
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
rejected its reliance on Muller's constructive discharge standard.
The Fifth Circuit provided two reasons for its decision:
Defendant urges, with some supporting authority, that in order to
constitute a constructive discharge, the imposition of intolerable
working conditions must be with the purpose of forcing the em-
ployee to resign . . . . Nevertheless, such a rule is inconsistent
with authority in this Circuit and, we believe, with the realities of
modem employment. 90
The court's reference to the "realities of modern employment" is
somewhat cryptic. A plausible interpretation, given that the Bourque
court was rejecting the requirement that a plaintiff show that an em-
ployer had a specific intent to coerce her resignation, is that the
court was concerned with a plaintiff's ability to adduce evidence of
an employer's specific intent.9'
In rejecting the Muller standard, the Bourque court explicitly ar-
ticulated what had been implicit in both the Young and Calcote analy-
ses: namely, that a court should evaluate a constructive discharge
claim without reference to the "state of mind of the employer." 92
Instead, the analysis should concern itself with what the reasonable
employee would have done: "'[T]he trier of fact must be satisfied
that the. . . working conditions would have been so difficult or un-
pleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would
of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980), the plain-
tiff began work as an undercover investigator for a state licensing agency in 1965. For
four years, Miller, a black, investigated both black- and white-owned shops. In 1969,
Miller's supervisor asked him to inspect only black-owned shops because of fear of inter-
racial violence. Miller agreed to the change and received a promotion. The state agency
was unhappy with the quality of Miller's inspections and attempted to transfer him to a
different area, but he refused. After the agency fired him for refusing the transfer, Miller
brought a title VII action, arguing that the disparate treatment he received prompted
him to refuse the transfer and thus amounted to a constructive discharge. In affirming
the district court's finding that Miller had not been constructively discharged, the Fifth
Circuit pointed out that Miller had objected to inspecting black-owned shops only after
his discharge.
The Bourque court also agreed with an earlier case, Cullori v. East-West Gateway
Coordinating Counsel, 457 F. Supp. 335, 341 (E.D. Mo. 1978), in holding that "discrim-
ination manifesting itself in the form of unequal pay cannot, alone, be sufficient to sup-
port a finding of constructive discharge." Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65. For a discussion of
the relationship of a single "fact" of discrimination (generally i4sufficient to support
finding of constructive discharge) and an "aggravated situation" (generally sufficient to
support such finding under reasonable employee standard), see infra notes 107-16 and
accompanying text.
90 617 F.2d at 65 (citations and footnote omitted).
91 The Bourque court might have felt that'plaintiffs generally lack sufficient contact
with the person making the discriminatory decisions to show specific intent. Alternately,
the court may have assumed that a sophisticated employer might not reveal such an
intent to the employee even if the two had sufficient contact.
92 617 F.2d at 65.
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have felt compelled to resign." 93 The court, however, did not dis-
cuss what kind of showing would meet this standard; it was more
concerned with demonstrating why Bourque's resignation was not a
constructive discharge. Nevertheless, the Bourque court's discussion
indicates, by negative inference, what a court using the reasonable
employee standard should consider significant in deciding a claim of
constructive discharge.
The Fifth Circuit, for example, found that the conditions that
Bourque described "[did] not constitute . . . an aggravated situa-
tion."' 94 Although the court stated that the occurrence of unlawful
discrimination is relevant to a constructive discharge inquiry, dis-
crimination, by itself, did not amount to a constructive discharge.95
Indeed, the court concluded that the plaintiff will frequently have to
combat the unlawful discrimination while still employed: "[W]e be-
lieve that society and the policies underlying Title VII will be best
served if, wherever possible, unlawful discrimination is attacked
within the context of existing employment relationships." 96
Although the court did not expressly identify those societal and
title VII policies, the context of its statement is instructive. The
93 Id. (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir.
1977)). Thus, Bourque was not the first case explicitly to adopt a reasonable employee
standard in the context of employment relations.
The Rosado case involved a former civil servant's claim that his transfer to a new city
was retaliation for his criticism of the administration of social welfare programs. Rosado
was not a title VII case because Rosado's claim rested on first amendment grounds,
Rosado maintaining that the transfer deprived him of his right to free speech. The First
Circuit was concerned, however, that without a standard to assess when an employer has
constructively discharged an employee there would be no effective check on public em-
ployee resignations in the face of grievances caused by an employer's action.
Unless the [employer's action] is, in effect, a discharge, the employee has
no right simply to walk out; he must accept the orders of his superior,
even if felt to be unjust, until relieved of them by judicial or administra-
tive action. Were this not so, a public employee would be encouraged to
set himself up as the judge of every grievance; and the public taxpayer
would end up paying for periods of idleness while the grie'vance was be-
ing adjudicated.
562 F.2d at 119.
94 617 F.2d at 66. The language of the opinion demonstrates that the court uses
the phrase "aggravated situation" interchangeably with "intolerable conditions." Later
court decisions utilizing the reasonable employee standard have refined the analysis by
requiring the plaintiff to point to certain "aggravating factors" as prompting his resigna-
tion. See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text (discussing Pittman v. Hattiesburg
Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981)) and note 107 (discussing
Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
95 617 F.2d at 66. The court indicated that unequal pay alone does not sustain a
showing of intolerable conditions so as to constitute a constructive discharge. For sub-
sequent Fifth Circuit cases suggesting that certain forms of discrimination, by them-
selves, may be sufficient to constitute constructive discharge, see infra notes 117-38 and
accompanying text.
96 617 F.2d at 66.
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court was rejecting Bourque's contention that employees suffering
illegal discrimination should be able to resign merely to pursue re-
dress free from fear of employer retaliation.97 The court apparently
felt Bourque should have complained to the EEOC prior to re-
signing. Given that the EEOC usually attempts to mediate disputes
between parties, 98 the title VII and, by extension, societal goal
served is the nonlitigious resolution of employer-employee disputes
within an ongoing employment relationship. In addition, the court
stated that Bourque had the duty to mitigate damages by remaining
on the job.99 This requirement also fosters the nonlitigious resolu-
tion of disputes and would presumably extend to all those suffering
discrimination not sufficiently egregious to justify resignation.
Taken together, the goal of resolving disputes without litigation
and the duty to mitigate damages imply that in some circumstances
an employee should have a duty to attempt to alleviate the intolera-
ble conditions before he is justified in resigning. Where such an
attempt is possible, the reasonable employee would adopt the less
drastic alternative of complaining about the intolerable conditions
rather than resigning; therefore, the employee who resigns is unrea-
sonable. Voluntary acceptance without complaint 00 indicates that a
reasonable employee would not find the conditions intolerable.
97 Id. at 65-66. The Fifth Circuit offered another reason why employees should
remain on the job when fighting discrimination: namely, the prohibition on employer
retaliation against employees who have filed charges with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
98 Section 1601.20 of the EEOC Regulations indicates that the EEOC should try to
encourage the parties to settle the dispute on mutually agreeable terms. The procedure
for negotiation "clearly establishes the Commission's commitment to assisting charging
parties and respondents in finding an early and reasonable resolution of charges when-
ever possible." EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 15.1, at 15:0001 (May 1979) (quoted in B.
SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 2, at 945). For a detailed presentation of the EEOC's
administrative process, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 2, ch. 26.
99 617 F.2d at 66. The court's discussion of damages refers to situations in which
parties in an employment discrimination action failed to resolve their dispute before a
court settled it. The concern with limiting the extent of damages-both before and after
litigation commences-is present in both instances.
100 The duty to mitigate by complaining or seeking redress, either inside or outside
the company, would arise when the discrimination occurred after the beginning of the
particular employment relationship. Bourque provides an example. No evidence sug-
gests that Bourque was encountering discrimination as a secretarial supervisor. She vol-
untarily accepted the buyer's position, knowing that even if her employer agreed to her
salary request, she would be paid less than her male predecessor. See supra notes 82-83
and accompanying text. Had the facts shown that Bourque accepted the position under-
standing that she would be paid the same as other buyers, but that her salary had lagged
behind that of a comparable male buyer, then she would not have voluntarily accepted a
discriminatory situation. Nevertheless, a reasonable employee would most probably
complain about the unequal pay, hoping that a complaint would obviate the need for
taking more drastic action.
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The Bourque court applied this logic to hold that Bourque had re-
signed voluntarily:
While we by no means discount the discrimination Ms. Bourque
may have faced, we simply do not believe that working for une-
qual pay under the circumstances presented here constitutes a
condition of employment so intolerable that an employee is
forced into involuntary resignation. The very fact that Ms. Bour-
que accepted the position under the conditions imposed belies
such a contention. 10'
The facts of the Bourque case, however, made it an inappropriate
vehicle for a full discussion of the issues surrounding the duty to
mitigate and the aggravated situation requirement. Bourque made
no attempt to mitigate her damages prior to resigning. She did not
complain about her unequal salary, seek internal redress, or inform
the EEOC about her complaint until after she had resigned. More-
over, Bourque's only evidence of an aggravated work situation was
her employer's salary discrimination. Some evidence indicated that
Bourque's co-workers and supervisors were pleased with her
work.'02 This evidence raises the question of whether employer
suggestions that an employee remain with the company are relevant
to determination of the aggravated situation issue. The Bourque de-
cision, although not settling the issues that it raised, provided a
framework for refinement of the reasonable employee standard.
Three subsequent Fifth Circuit cases address, either explicitly or by
implication, what constitutes an aggravated situation and what the
duty to mitigate entails.
C. Post Bourque Decisions-Pittman, Welch, and Meyer: The
Reasonable Employee Standard With a Bite
1. Pittman: Development of the Aggravating Factors Analysis
Under the reasonable employee standard a plaintiff need not
show that the employer's purpose in creating the allegedly discrimi-
natory conditions was to force an involuntary resignation. Consid-
ered by itself, the reasonable employee standard does not expressly
articulate what the plaintiff must show to prove a constructive dis-
charge. This lack of specificity should not burden a plaintiff prepar-
ing for trial because she will offer all evidence tending to show that
employment conditions were onerous. It is more significant, how-
ever, to an aggrieved employee who, while remaining on the job,
attempts to determine whether a court would find her resignation to
be a constructive discharge. An aggrieved employee, aware that the
101 617 F.2d at 65.
102 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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law requires her to remain on the job unless employment conditions
become "aggravated," does not know how intolerable conditions
must become before she will be justified in resigning. In Pittman v.
Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School District, 10 3 the Fifth Circuit re-
fined the aggravated situation formulation in Bourque. The Pittman
court also indicated that a court considering what a reasonable em-
ployee would have done should consider an employer's expressed
desire that an employee not resign.
Pittman involved a claim of unequal pay due to racial discrimina-
tion. Pittman began working for the defendant school district as an
assistant to the district's printer in June 1971. The printer resigned
in August 1972; his salary at that time was $6,900. The district
hired Pittman for the vacant position on a trial basis at a salary of
$5,000. Pittman did not have an assistant, as did his predecessor.
Pittman's trial period ended in August 1983, and the district for-
mally promoted him to the position of printer. 10 4 After this promo-
tion he was earning $900 less than his white predecessor. Several
requests for parity in salary were ineffectual, and Pittman finally re-
signed on August 14, 1974. One month later, the district rehired
Pittman's predecessor, paying him $1,200 more than Pittman had
received at the time of his resignation. 10 5 Pittman sued the school
district, alleging racial discrimination, and the district court, adopt-
ing a United States magistrate's findings, entered judgment for the
defendant. 10 6
The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment for the defendant but
held that the school district had not constructively discharged Pitt-
man.' 0 7 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Bourque holding
that inequality of pay, standing alone, cannot transform a resigna-
tion into an involuntary discharge. 108 The Pittman court echoed the
"aggravated situation" language of Bourque, but spoke with greater
specificity about the need to show "aggravating factors."' 1 9 The
103 644 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981).
104 Id. at 1073.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1073-74. Both the magistrate's and the district court's decisions were
unreported.
107 Id. at 1077.
108 Id.
109 Id. The Pittman aggravating factors analysis was applied in Clark v. Marsh, 665
F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Clark, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the trial court's award of reinstatement and remanded for a determination of
back pay for the period subsequent to the plaintiffs resignation because Clark had
shown "a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment encompassing deprivation of
opportunities for promotion, lateral transfer, and increased educational training, ex-
isting over a period of several years." Id. at 1174, 1176. Moreover, the plaintiff in Clark
had twice pursued internal administrative remedies without success. Id. at 1174. The
court focused on the circumstances surrounding the last promotion denied the plaintiff.
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Pittman decision suggests that to prove constructive discharge the
plaintiff must be able to point to specific elements in the relation-
ship, apart from the act giving rise to title VII liability, that made
working conditions intolerable. Although an employer's discrimina-
tory act is relevant to the constructive discharge inquiry, a plaintiff
will not succeed with his constructive discharge claim by merely
identifying the discriminatory act and alleging intolerable condi-
tions in only generalized terms.
The Pittman court did not directly address the question of what
constitutes an aggravating factor, but it listed several elements it
would have considered significant had they been present in the case.
The court noted that Pittman's employment relations were cor-
dial. 10 The court also acknowledged that the district superinten-
dent had urged Pittman to remain and that he had suffered no
affront aside from the race-based wage discrimination.'11 If Pittman
had demonstrated continuing affronts or hostile working conditions,
the Fifth Circuit presumably would have found that the district had
constructively discharged him.
Taken together, the aggravating factors that Pittman identified
as necessary for a finding of constructive discharge indicate that the
court requires a nexus between the title VII discriminatory act and
the conditions prompting the employee's resignation.' 1 2 The pres-
Clark had been deputy director for three years and acting director for one. Despite
favorable performance reviews, her superiors passed her over for promotion to perma-
nent director in favor of "a recent law school graduate with no supervisory experience."
Id. at 1174-75. ,
The Clark opinion catalogues the various concerns that courts using a reasonable
employee standard have had in deciding constructive discharge cases. The Clark court
was careful to enumerate the various forms of discrimination that Clark encountered.
Unlike Pittman and Bourque where the discriminatory act was unequal pay, Clark's dis-
crimination was manifested in different aspects such that the "[p]laintiff was . . . essen-
tially locked into a position from which she could apparently obtain no relief." Id. at
1174. The court concluded that her repeated failure to obtain administrative relief was
one factor justifying her belief that she had no recourse but to resign. Id. at 1175-76.
Unlike Bourque, Clark had first attempted to resolve her problem within the context of
an ongoing employment relationship. Finally, the Clark court indicated that it shared
the Pittman court's concern with work place conditions in its focus upon Clark's humilia-
tion and loss of prestige after being passed over for a job that she had capably per-
formed for a year.
110 644 F.2d at 1077.
111 Id.
112 Requiring demonstration of a nexus between the discriminatory act constituting
the basis of title VII liability and the intolerable work conditions is significant in two
ways. First, it limits title VII proscriptions to the behavior specified in the act. Second,
the nexus requirement serves an evidentiary function. For example, an employer's con-
tinued use of racial epithets toward an employee who previously had been denied a
promotion more readily supports a conclusion that the promotion decision was made on
race-based criteria than when such abuse is absent. Similarly, a court applying the rea-
sonable employee standard should find the constructive discharge determination easier
because a reasonable employee would probably conclude that an attempt to mitigate or
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ence of continuing affronts and noncordial working conditions sug-
gests the intentional singling out of an employee because of her
race. Of course, wage discrimination "singles out" an employee for
different treatment. The Fifth Circuit, however, had already held
that unequal pay, standing alone, did not constitute a constructive
discharge. Presumably, the Fifth Circuit was concerned with over-
extending title VII coverage by making an employer liable for its
imposition of conditions-apart from the wage discrimination-
when it had imposed those conditions with an intent not proscribed
by title VII. Thus, even under the Bourque reasonable employee
standard, evidence of invidious intent is relevant in deciding con-
structive discharge claims.
The Pittman court also acknowledged the relevance of evidence
showing that the employer wanted the employee to remain on the
job.11 3 By noting that Pittman's employer urged him to stay, the
Fifth Circuit suggested that a reasonable employee would consider
such manifestations of the employer's intent in determining whether
resignation was the only available option. An employer's statements
or remedial actions might suggest, for example, the possibility of
improved conditions. Nevertheless, such manifestations cannot, by
themselves, determine the constructive discharge issue. If a court
treated them as dispositive of the issue of what a reasonable em-
ployee would do, such an analysis would effectively transform the
reasonable employee standard into the employer intent standard.
ameliorate probably would not succeed if an employer had demonstrated such a consis-
tent pattern of animosity.
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases display the court's concern that the conditions com-
plained of relate to a title VII proscribed intent. See Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776,
779 (5th Cir. 1983) (no constructive discharge because "no showing. . . that this [trans-
fer] was unusual or unreasonable or in any way motivated by race or sex"); Miller v.
Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.) ("[Constructive dis-
charge] recognizes a Title VII cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employer
deliberately creates a discriminatory environment. ), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891
(1980).
Courts in other jurisdictions have expressed a similar nexus requirement and, im-
plicitly, the same concern that liability be limited to what title VII proscribes. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); EEOC v. Hay Assocs.,
545 F. Supp. 1064, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
An employer facing a constructive discharge claim may argue that the intolerable
conditions, while deliberately imposed, were motivated by animus not proscribed by
title VII. Courts must carefully evaluate such a defense. An employer, for example,
might not want a neo-fascist working in its organization but would prefer not to fire her
directly. Title VII, because it does not proscribe discrimination based on an employee's
political beliefs, would not prohibit the imposition of intolerable conditions calculated
to effectuate the employee's departure. Courts should carefully scrutinize an employer's
claim that his actions were politically motivated if the imposition of the conditions
closely followed a promotion denial violating title VII.
113 644 F.2d at 1077.
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The Pittman analysis suggests that the Fifth Circuit regards indica-
tions of the employer's benign intent as only one of several factors
bearing on the tolerability of an employee's working conditions.
The Pittman court's refinement of Bourque's "aggravated situa-
tion" analysis and its indication that an employer's intent is still rele-
vant under the reasonable employee standard occurred in a factual
context much like Bourque's. Both were unequal pay cases in which
the issue of liability was settled; in assessing the issue of constructive
discharge, the Fifth Circuit's primary concern was fixing the extent of
that liability. In Welch v. University of Texas & Its Marine Science Insti-
tute1 14 and Meyer v. Brown & Root Construction Co. 115 the constructive
discharge question arose in a different context. In these cases, the
Fifth Circuit focused on whether an employer's behavior amounted
to an employee discharge within the meaning of section 703(a)(1) of
title VII.116 Thus, the resolution of these constructive discharge
claims determined whether the employer was liable under title VII.
2. Welch: Showing Aggravating Conditions Is Not
a Per Se Requirement
Although the Fifth Circuit indicated that application of the rea-
sonable employee standard was still appropriate, the resolution of
the constructive discharge issue in Welch had a different implication
than in either Bourque or Pittman. The Welch court's analysis implies
that in certain instances a plaintiff can demonstrate intolerable con-
ditions without proving aggravating factors. Hired as a research as-
sistant at the marine biological institute where she did research
toward a doctorate in education, 117 Welch was twice told by her su-
pervisor that he did not want a woman in his employ. Welch re-
signed after a meeting in which her supervisor told her that having a
doctorate made her overqualified for her job.118 The district court
concluded that the supervisor's comments amounted to a construc-
tive discharge of Welch. 119
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's determination that
114 659 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981).
115 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981).
116 See supra note 3 for the statutory language of § 703(a)(1).
117 Welch v. University of Tex. & Its Marine Science Inst., 659 F.2d 531, 533 (5th
Cir. 1981).
118 Id. The supervisor made the first statement before Welch received her doctoral
degree. The second statement was made a year later, after Welch had earned her de-
gree. Id. These statements, while expressing a prejudicial attitude, probably were not
actionable under title VII because they did not amount to a pattern of offensive remarks.
Cf. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)
("derogatory ethnic comments ... were part of causal conversation and did not rise to
the level necessary to constitute a violation of Title VII").
119 659 F.2d at 533. The district court opinion was unreported.
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Welch had resigned involuntarily. 120 The court analyzed the facts of
Welch under the Bourque reasonable employee standard.12 ' The
court did not, however, adopt the "aggravated situation" approach
set forth in Bourque and refined in Pittman. Indeed, the supervisor's
two statements, made a year apart, could scarcely constitute aggra-
vating circumstances sufficient to justify a finding of constructive
discharge. 122 The Welch court's approach to the constructive dis-
charge issue implicitly acknowledges that, factually, this case is un-
like either Bourque or Pittman.
Both Pittman and Bourque held that proof of discrimination
alone was insufficient to constitute a constructive discharge. 123
Moreover, the Pittman court was concerned that the plaintiff show a
nexus between the discriminatory act and the allegedly intolerable
conditions. 124 Such a concern is inapposite in Welch because the
constructive discharge was the act of discrimination. In this instance
of alleged disparate treatment, Welch had to prove that her em-
ployer treated her differently because of her sex. Welch prevailed
because the supervisor's statements plainly demonstrated his
animus. 125
Given the absence of the "aggravated situation" language in
Welch, the most likely explanation for the court's result is that when
an employer clearly expresses its desire that an employee resign, the
120 Id. at 534 ("The findings of the district court that Welch's supervisor told her
that as a woman doctor she would be unable to work for him and demanded to know,
once she had received her Ed.D., when she would leave her employment are supported
by the record and do not leave this court with the conviction that a mistake has been
committed."). The Fifth Circuit's choice of language is explained by the context in
which it appeared: the court was examining the trial court finding under the "clearly
erroneous" standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Id. at 533.
121 Id. at 534 ("A reasonable person would certainly resign employment after being
ordered to leave."). The Welch outcome would probably be the same under a Muller
standard because the employer manifested a desire that she leave.
122 The court implied, however, that the supervisor may have expressed his discrimi-
natory attitude at other times: "In light of past dealings with this individual, Welch
responded that since it was obvious he did not want a woman with a doctorate working
for him, she would leave .. " Id. at 533. The facts do not reveal whether Welch's
supervisor was hostile towards Welch in particular, or women in general. Although
Welch was replaced by a woman with a bachelor's degree, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that this replacement did not preclude Welch's sex discrimination suit in light of the
difference in education levels. Id. & n.3. As noted before, the court rested its decision
on the correctness of the trial court's findings concerning the two statements made by
the supervisor. See supra note 120. The indication that the supervisor had previously
expressed these attitudes is significant because such statements might well render
Welch's working atmosphere hostile. The Pittman court suggested that a hostile working
environment constitutes an aggravating factor as part of showing a constructive dis-
charge. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text for the Bourque court's discussion,
and note 108 and accompanying text for the Pittman reaffirmation of Bourque.
124 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
12-5 See supra note 120.
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employer has constructively discharged the employee regardless of
the quality of working conditions. The result in Welch effectively
transforms the Bourque reasonable employee standard into a two-
pronged standard that is superficially like Muller's.126 Instead of re-
quiring a plaintiff to show both an employer's intent to force resigna-
tion and intolerable conditions, however, an employee would
succeed under the reasonable employee standard by showing either
intolerable conditions or an unambiguous intent to coerce an em-
ployee's resignation motivated by a title VII proscribed bias. Courts
would evaluate a plaintiff's claim under either prong using a reason-
able employee analysis.
3. Meyer: The Notion of Prospective Intolerable Conditions
In Meyer v. Brown & Root Construction Co. 127 the Fifth Circuit, in
applying a reasonable employee standard, returned to the aggra-
vated situation analysis developed in Bourque and refined in Pittman.
The court's treatment of Meyer's claim suggested a further expan-
sion of the aggravated situation analysis. The defendant employer
hired Meyer in 1976 as a warehouse office helper. 128 In September
1978 Meyer told her supervisor that she was pregnant; in turn her
supervisor informed Meyer that the company would give her a leave
of absence. 129 On January 8, 1979, Meyer was asked to train a re-
placement. The following day, Meyer arrived at work to find her
replacement sitting at her desk. Meyer's supervisor told her that she
would thereafter be working in the warehouse. Knowing that this
position entailed heavy lifting, Meyer expressed apprehension about
the adverse effects on her health and on that of her unborn child. In
reply, Meyer's supervisor "snickered."'130 Further discussion re-
vealed that the supervisor was unconcerned about the consequences
of the transfer. The trial court concluded that the employer had
126 See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
127 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981).
128 Id. at 370.
129 Id. at 371.
130 Id. The Fifth Circuit reproduced the conversation as follows:
[W]hen Plaintiff questioned York [her supervisor] as to what she was go-
ing to do, he replied "you're going to work with Ed and Phil." Plaintiff
replied that she could not do that without harming herself or her unborn
baby, while York stood by snickering. Plaintiff remarked that she did not
think York would do that, where upon York remarked "What?"
Plaintiff then said "Jim, go home and sleep on it tonight and see if
you wake up with a clear conscience."
York said "I have."
Plaintiff then said "What more do I say? I'm going. . . you know, fix
up my papers because I'm going home."
Id. at 372 n.4 (quoting findings of fact in unreported district court decision).
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constructively discharged Meyer.' 3 '
In affirming the trial court's determination that Meyer's resig-
nation constituted a constructive discharge, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit followed Welch by using the Bourque reasonable
employee standard to assess the constructive discharge issue. Un-
like Welch, however, the court analyzed the facts in terms much like
the "aggravated situation" formulation of Bourque. Discussing the
conversation in which Meyer learned of her new assignment, the
court remarked, "Certainly, a reasonable person would leave when
presented with such a situation."' 3 2 This discussion differed from
Bourque's analysis because Bourque implied that a constructive dis-
charge requires a discriminatory act and aggravating circumstances.
The discriminatory act alleged in Meyer was the constructive dis-
charge. Indeed, Meyer could not have expected her supervisor's ac-
tion because she apparently had no prior indication of his hostility
towards her.133 In effect, the Meyer court held that a reasonable em-
ployee could resign in the face of prospective intolerable conditions
without having to show prior aggravating circumstances.
The court, however, indicated that to prove a constructive dis-
charge a plaintiff would have to show that she knew what those con-
ditions entailed. In response to the defendant employer's claim that
a reasonable person would have questioned her supervisor concern-
ing the nature of the assignment to the warehouse, the court found
that Meyer had inquired about the nature of her new duties.'3
Although the court's discussion does not explicitly conclude that the
plaintiff's inquiry satisfied her duty to mitigate damages, Meyer's in-
quiry apparently served to fulfill that duty. A hypothetical example,
based on the facts of the Meyer case, demonstrates how an inquiry
can fulfill the duty to mitigate damages. An employer could transfer
a woman because she was pregnant 35 and incur liability for this dis-
parate treatment without creating any intolerable condition. Failure
to inquire about the assignment before resigning would not fulfill
the employee's duty to mitigate damages. A complaint might have
resulted in redress of the conditions. Thus, the goal of resolving
131 Id. at 371. The district court's decision was unreported.
132 Id. at 372.
133 "It is undisputed that Meyer had a good work record and good working relation-
ship with her co-workers at all times during her tenure .... " Id. at 371. Whether the
court considered Meyer's supervisor a "co-worker" is unclear. Moreover, the court does
not discuss any evidence of unpleasant working conditions or prior hostility by Meyer's
supervisor.
134 Id. at 372.
135 Section 701(k) of title VII states that sex-based discrimination proscribed by
§ 703(a)(1)-(2) includes discrimination because of a woman's pregnancy. "The terms
'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on
the basis of pregnancy .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
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disputes without litigation would also be frustrated by a failure to
inquire.13 6 In the Welch case the Fifth Circuit did not discuss the
duty to mitigate damages. 137 This omission suggests that an em-
ployer's clearly evinced desire that an employee leave absolves the
employee of the duty to mitigate damages by complaint or
inquiry. '3 8
IV
CHOOSING BETWEEN THE Two STANDARDS
Should the courts adopt a uniform standard? The difference
between the employer intent and reasonable employee standards
for assessing a constructive discharge claim will not, in some in-
stances, have any impact on the resolution of the issue. In many
cases, proof of sufficiently egregious conditions alone will support
an inference that an employer imposed them with the intent de-
manded by the more stringent Muller standard.'3 9 In addition,
under a Bourque reasonable employee standard, an employee often
will have to complain about the intolerable conditions to fulfill her
duty to mitigate. These complaints would notify an employer of em-
ployee unhappiness and would probably amount to a constructive
discharge under Muller if the employer failed to ameliorate those
conditions or give the complaining employee a legitimate reason for
them.
A court's use of one standard or the other, however, will deter-
136 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
137 In another case a district court in the Fifth Circuit did not find a constructive
discharge because "a reasonable person in plaintiff's shoes would [not] have found that
the working conditions imposed by defendants compelled resignation. Plaintiff did not
object to most of these conditions." Jones v. Birdson, 530 F. Supp. 221, 234 (N.D. Miss.
1980). An employee's protest of discriminatory conditions aids a court in determining
whether the conditions forced the employee to resign involuntarily in several respects.
A protest provides the courts with at least a subjective indication that the conditions
were intolerable. An employee's protest also removes any doubt concerning the delib-
erateness of the employer's actions. Finally, given title VII's goal of promoting nonli-
tigious resolution of disputes, a protest might well result in the correction of the
intolerable conditions.
138 Because courts decide each constructive discharge case on its facts, the judiciary
should not make a duty to complain a per se requirement of a constructive discharge
showing under the reasonable employee standard. For example, if the employer had an
Equal Opportunity Employment Office and an employee failed to avail himself of it
before resigning, the employee would have failed to fulfill the duty to mitigate. A show-
ing that the employees who had complained to such an office were the objects of retalia-
tory actions by their supervisors, however, would indicate that an employee choosing
not to complain should not be found to have failed the duty.
The Welch result indicates that in the Fifth Circuit a complaint to the EEOC after
resignation and without an in-house complaint will not bar a plaintiff from prevailing on
a claim of constructive discharge in all cases.
139 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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mine the outcome in many cases. For example, in a case of sexual
harassment, or when an employer has repeatedly denied an em-
ployee a promotion in violation of title VII but hopes that the em-
ployee will remain in his current position, 140 the employer is almost
certainly imposing intolerable conditions. In these situations, the
employer does not typically intend to coerce the employee's resig-
nation. A plaintiff seeking redress in these situations would encoun-
ter substantial difficulty satisfying the Muller employer intent
standard. Under the Bourque reasonable employee standard, how-
ever, a plaintiff would probably succeed with his constructive dis-
charge claim.
Thus, courts utilizing different standards will reach different re-
sults in constructive discharge cases involving the same set of facts.
The outcome of a suit should not be determined by the fortuity of
which circuit the claim arises in. Moreover, title VII, a national anti-
discrimination law, should be applied uniformly. Therefore, all the
circuit courts should adopt one standard.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
which standard should apply, the Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 141 suggested some principles that should influence this de-
termination. The Court held that in fashioning remedies 142 for title
VII violations the two purposes underlying the statute must guide a
trial court's discretion. 143 First, the Court noted that title VII was
140 A slight modification of the facts of the Bourque case, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text, illustrates a situation in which an employer intentionally discrimi-
nates and intolerable conditions exist, but the employer did not intend to coerce a resig-
nation.
Bourque was apparently performing well as head of the typing pool in the buying
department. Bourque could have made out a case of constructive discharge if she could
have proven that she had applied for a buyer's position several times, been denied the
job because of her sex, and had her lateral transfers to other departments in the com-
pany blocked. Under the Bourque "aggravated situation" formulation, she could point to
both discriminatory acts and an offensive working environment. Moreover, her attempt
to transfer and avoid the unpleasantness of her situation might fulfill her duty to miti-
gate. Cf. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
141 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
142 Section 706(g) details the options that a court has in fashioning remedies. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to . . . back
pay. . . . Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two
years prior to a filing of a charge with the [Equal Employment Opportu-
nity] Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reason-
able diligence by the person . . . discriminated against shall operate to
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.
143 422 U.S. at 417.
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primarily designed as a prophylactic. The Court recognized how a
back pay award can act as a deterrent: "Back pay has an obvious
connection with this [prophylactic] purpose. If employers faced
only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little in-
centive to shun practices of dubious legality."' 44
Although the Albemarle Court was considering whether to award
back pay, its discussion is apposite here. The prospect of liability
for back pay145 can have a powerful deterrent effect, even in non-
class-action cases. 146 If an employer can escape or reduce its liabil-
ity by concealing its intention to force an employee out, however,
the deterrent effect of back pay liability will be considerably weak-
ened. Under the more stringent employer intent standard, employ-
ers will sometimes escape liability because of the difficulties that the
plaintiff will encounter in proving that the employer had the requi-
site intent. Even when an employer imposes intolerable conditions
without intending to compel an employee's resignation, the possi-
bility of monetary liability should cause employers to reexamine
their practices. Thus, the Supreme Court's elucidation of the im-
portance of back pay supports the use of a reasonable employee
standard for assessing a claim of constructive discharge.
The second purpose of title VII identified by the Court in Al-
bemarle is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination."' 147 Both the reasonable em-
ployee and employer intent standards further this purpose to some
extent, because both recognize the applicability of the doctrine of
constructive discharge to title VII litigation. The reasonable em-
ployee standard, however, will be more likely to provide relief that
will fully compensate the employee. The following example illus-
trates the difference between the two standards: An employee suf-
fers repeated discriminatory acts, including denials of promotion,
transfer, and education, because he is black; nonetheless, his em-
ployer considers him a valuable employee in his present position.
The employer attempts to answer the employee's protests that he is
being discriminated against by explaining that blacks are simply not
ready to assume higher positions in the company.
144 Id.
145 Reinstatement is another remedy available in title VII cases. Courts sometimes
award "front" pay in lieu of reinstatement. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747
F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984). The Goss court defined this relief as "an award for a reasonable
future period required for the victim to reestablish her rightful place in the job market."
Id. at 889.
146 For example, the back pay award to the plaintiff in Goss, was for a two year pe-
riod. It totaled $78,454.23; the court added prejudgment interest to the award at 12%
per annum. Id. at 889.
147 422 U.S. at 418.
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In this example, if the employee resigns and brings suit under
title VII, he should prevail on his claim of disparate treatment be-
cause he could show intentional differential treatment motivated by
an intent proscribed by title VII. Under the reasonable employee
standard, the plaintiff would probably prevail on a constructive dis-
charge claim. The employee could identify several different types of
discrimination, attempts to mitigate by transfer requests and objec-
tions, and continued affronts to him because of his race. Under the
employer intent standard, however, the employee would not be able
to show that the employer possessed a specific intent to compel his
resignation. If the employee lost on the issue of constructive dis-
charge, a court would conclude that his departure was voluntary and
award back pay only up to the date of his resignation.148 Given such
an outcome, the employee has not been made whole because he has
not been placed in the situation he would have been in had he not
been the victim of discrimination.
The make-whole policy of Albemarle is implicated in another
context. Discriminatory acts may deprive the employee of a job
benefit that is not easily measured in monetary terms, such as a cor-
dial work environment. In these instances courts have provided in-
junctive relief.' 49 These types of discrimination provide additional
support for adoption of the reasonable employee standard. An indi-
vidual resigning because of sexual harassment, for example, can
only receive injunctive relief should she fail to prove a constructive
discharge. Providing injunctive relief while denying such compen-
satory remedies as back pay or reinstatement does not serve the
make-whole policy articulated in Albemarle.
The reasonable employee standard also represents a more eq-
uitable balancing of the employer and employee interests and title
VII policies at stake in a constructive discharge claim than does the
employer intent standard. Several different title VII policies are rel-
evant in a constructive discharge case, including the basic goals of
deterring discriminatory behavior and making victims whole, 50 the
preference for nonlitigious resolution of disputes,15 and the duty to
mitigate damages. 152 Although an important concern, the policy of
148 See, e.g., Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 1975)
("Unless [plaintiff] was constructively discharged, he would not be entitled to damages
in the form of back pay. . from the date of leaving the [defendant's] employ.").
149 See, e.g., Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (imposing injunc-
tive relief by requiring defendant employer to establish internal procedures for hearing,
adjudicating, and remedying complaints of sexual harassment).
150 See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418, discussed supra notes 147-48 and accompanying
text.
151 See Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980), discussed
supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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nonlitigious dispute resolution is subordinate to both the deterrent
and make-whole policies of title VII because the Act provides for a
private right of action if Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion mediation fails. This right of action does not depend on an
employee continuing with his company. The Pittman case is an ex-
ample of an employee recovering for discrimination even though he
resigned voluntarily. 153
The reasonable employee standard, as argued above, serves the
deterrent and make-whole policies underlying title VII. The con-
cern with adopting this less stringent standard is that it will under-
mine the policy of resolving employer-employee disputes without
litigation by encouraging employees to leave. 154 Knowing that they
will have an easier task of proving constructive discharge claims if
they do not have to prove an employer's specific intent, employees
may be more likely to resign. A person arguing for the employer
intent standard might acknowledge that it will frustrate the deter-
rent and make-whole policies in a limited number of cases, but
would maintain that this standard will foster nonlitigious resolution
of disputes in all instances. She might also contend that the reason-
able employee standard will encourage employee resignations,
thereby disrupting employment relationships and triggering numer-
ous lawsuits. Hence, the argument would conclude, the employer's
interests in escaping liability and the title VII goal of maintaining
the employment relationship are congruent in this respect.
The Fifth Circuit's development of the reasonable employee
standard addresses these concerns. Both the "aggravating factors"
analysis 155 and the requirement that there be a nexus between the
discriminatory act' 56 and those aggravating factors demonstrate that
courts applying the reasonable employee standard still critically
evaluate the facts of a case before finding that the employer has
committed a constructive discharge. Moreover, the articulation of
these concepts in connection with the reasonable employee stan-
dard adds a measure of predictability to court decisions under what
otherwise might be an overly flexible standard. The reasonable em-
ployee standard will not encourage employee resignation if the em-
ployee is required to mitigate damages. Adoption of this duty 57
153 The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the trial court's determination that Pittman had
not suffered wage discrimination, remanded the case to the district court to assess dam-
ages. Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir.
1981).
154 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
157 Both the concern about excessive employee resignation and the response that
imposing a duty to mitigate will check this trend assume that employees know which
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will encourage employees to complain about unpleasant conditions
either through internal company procedures or by contacting the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Finally, the less stringent reasonable employee standard serves
employee interests by relieving an aggrieved employee of the need
to show an employer's specific intent to compel his resignation. As
the Fifth Circuit indicated in Pittman, manifestations of. the em-
ployer's intent are relevant in evaluating the intolerability of work
conditions. Of the two parties, the employer is in the better posi-
tion to explain its actions. Moreover, an employee should not be
required to remain in ajob when, as measured by an objective stan-
dard, there is no reasonable hope of salvaging the employment
relationship.
CONCLUSION
The split of authority among the current courts of appeals over
the proper standard for assessing whether an employee has been
constructively discharged should be resolved by the adoption of an
objective standard. This analysis would recognize that an employee
has been constructively discharged when a reasonable person in the
employee's position would find conditions so intolerable that she
would resign. This reasonable employee standard would permit
flexibility and be responsive to the factual differences of each case.
Moreover, the standard would be more compatible with Supreme
Court pronouncements on related issues. The adoption of such a
standard serves the policies underlying title VII while equitably bal-
ancing the interests of the employer and employee.
Martin W. O'Toole*
standard courts will apply to their claims of constructive discharge. If employees who
are subject to a discriminatory or simply unpleasant situation first resign and then seek
legal redress, a court's choice of standard will have no impact upon employee resigna-
tion decisions. Employees will only become apprised of their rights and duties after they
have left their positions. In companies that have litigated constructive discharge claims,
knowledge of the cases' outcomes might inform employees about the standard. Where
courts have denied claims of constructive discharge because of an employee's failure to
mitigate damages by complaint to the employer or the EEOC, knowledge of these deci-
sions within a company will inform other employees of this duty.
* The author acknowledges and thanks Professors Michael E. Gold of the School
of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University and Stewart J. Schwab of the
Cornell Law School for their assistance.
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